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13. Study of the Operational Risk of 3166 Local Governments in Hungary 
between 2003 and 2012 




In the process of shaping up the theoretical framework, we substituted operational incomes and 
expenditures into the value function of prospect theory. By this we achieved that the results of economic 
psychological research concerning loss and risk aversion could also be applied in the analysis of state 
financial decisions. Discretionary decisions can be placed in distinct reference frameworks on the side of 
both incomes and expenditures. Decisions made in risky situations can be analysed with both utility 
axioms and in the conceptual framework of psychological value. 
Because of the properties of the operational system of the modern state, we gave preference to the 
psychological approach of the behavioural economics. By this approach, we determined the theoretical 
value of the operational risk of discretionary decisions, which we interpreted as inherent risk and, in the 
course of an empirical study; we made it correspond to the experiential values. 
Instead of the macroeconomic level of the state’s role-taking and operational risk, we have 
focussed our research on the system of subnational governments. Wide and detailed secondary data are 
available about Hungarian local governments, so we carried out our research on a large number of 
these. Virtually, based on treasury date, we studied 3166 Hungarian local governments in the period 
between 2003 and 2012.  
The result of the statistical analysis is the fact that Hungarian local governments made their 
financial and budgetary decisions by taking considerable risk concerning their environment. The local 
governmental level treated their uncertain operational environments in a risk-preferring manner and the 
established level of risk relatable to discretionary decisions between 2003 and 2012 came to over the 
theoretical value in the vast number of Hungarian local governments studied. 
 




The aspects of operational risk management of credit institutions can be applied to the 
analysis of decisions in state household financial-economic management. Credit institutions are 
specific, property-based risk-taking communities, where the credit institution, as a private 
enterprise, apart from its fundamental business activity, takes considerable social responsibility 
for the availability of certain groups of assets, including undisturbed operation of payment 
systems or repayment of deposits. Taking this responsibility towards the economic environment 
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can be so great that the credit enterprise establishes a risk-taking community, which can be 
extended to those beyond directly affected. In a given case, credit institutions represent too large 
financial size in the economy to create durable operational trouble in their fundamental activities 
(“too big to fail”), therefore, it is of social interest to save them (Botos 2014, Rajan 2005, 2010). 
A similar situation can be identified at some institutions of the state, especially in the case 
of natural monopolies and, eventually, in the whole of the operation of the state itself. Further on, 
we shall apply the above generalization to the state, then to the local level of the operation of the 
state, which, similarly to credit institutions, does its activity in a special environment concerning 
operational risk. 
Operational risk demonstrates the internal balance of the state’s institutional system and 
the sustainability of its institutions, proportional to the demands of the environment. Operational 
balance exists between the resources tapped from the environment and the goods produced for 
the environment. The financial conditions of continuous accommodation to the environment are 
provided by the state budget, which we interpret as a sensitive subsystem within the framework 
of the functioning of the state, ensuring and allocating the resources in a balance-creating 
manner. As our objective is the interpretation of operational risk, further on we study the 
operational budget of the state1. 
Looking at the sides of income and expenditure together, we can see that considerable 
social, economic and natural environmental problems may remain unsolved, in case the state 
covers the operational costs from the regulated tax bases of optimal size and adjusts it to the 
operational income from the optimal extent of taxes. In this case, the state has used up all the 
information for making decisions on the side of income, on the side of expenditure, however, it 
                                                 
1 Calculations for the balance of the budget can be done according to different kinds of international statistical 
systems. Statistical and state accountancy systems separate the operational, cumulative (capital) and financial 
transactional parts of state budgets. Processes of cumulative budget related to property items do not directly 
influence the development of budget. Transactions connected with state property aim to continuously transform 
(expand, reduce) institutional capacities, which are connected with changes in operational processes with time lag. A 
process of restructuring an institution appears at the end of a series of operations in altered capacity indices 
influencing the extent of operational costs, so its effect is built in the state operational budgetary estimates with 
some delay. In the system of budgetary estimates financing operations play a balancing role, therefore neither 
logically nor according to typical financial-technical solutions do they belong to the sphere of concepts of budgetary 
estimate (Vigvári 2008). 
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has ignored several demands. On the contrary, using up all the information on the expenditure 
side, in other words, bringing the size of institutional capacity closer to the possible demands, 
overburdening the possible tax bases or overtaxing the regulated tax bases appear as social and 
economic drawbacks. Because of the above, we ascribe the positive or negative balances of 
operational budget to the uncertainty of the operational environment of the state. Looking at any 
period of time, regulated tax bases or making demands on institutional capacities may fluctuate 
irrespective of each other.  
Therefore, we look at operational risk as something determined from the outside: the 
system of conditions, to which state decision-makers have to respond, depends on the changes in 
the state of the environment. Operational budget gives a good approximation to the uncertainty 
and imbalance of operational environment, the negative value of which expresses the operational 
risk of the state related to its external environment. The presence of operational risk, its statistic 
fluctuation and also its unexpected, accidental change mean special operational conditions and 
constant compulsion of accommodation for the state household. Therefore, the modern state 
maintains an internal regulatory system, by which it ensures the sustainability of its operation. 
Regulation-based operation and normativity curbs the influence of external effects affecting the 
system (Allen − Tommasi 2001, Barr 2009, Lengyel − Rechnitzer 2004, Musgrave − Musgrave 
1989, Stiglitz 2001, Szabó − Hámori 2006, Vigvári 2008).  
 
2. Interpretation of loss and risk aversion in state-financial decisions 
 
From the point of view of the state, we can interpret the phenomenon of loss and risk 
avoidance in two ways: from the aspect of relations to the external environment on one hand and 
the aspect of the internal environment of state economic management on the other. The relations 
to external (political, economic, social and natural) effects can, under certain conditions2, 
approach the expectations of the individual. In certain situations, the decision-making 
mechanism of the state can be motivated in minimizing the individual’s losses, since in a given 
case; they are just directed to this. The establishment of the historic state, its existence presume 
the essential demand of the individual for security, his inclination to avoid losses and risks. For 
                                                 
2 We have borrowed the informational conditions from the Tiebout Hypothesis, which we have taken as the 
informational background for state household decision-making processes (Vigvári 2008). 
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the individual gives up part of his / her freedom to make decisions when joining the risk 
community, in order to increase his / her security and welfare.  
In case of discretional decisions, relation to the demands appearing in the external 
environment is very strong and the decision can depend on special reference points: in financial 
sense it is of base approach and in economic-psychological sense it is path dependent3. In case of 
decisions of such informational background, the state’s decision-maker is forced to identify itself 
with the loss of citizens; therefore it discerns loss as early as during the preparation of the 
decision and wants to move towards a lesser loss from the beginning. From the behavioural-
economic point of view, presuming Kahneman and Tversky’s value function, the state originally 
moves within the range of loss. Depending on the reference framework shaped during the 
preparation of decision, virtually it is ready to make the move from any reference point. To put it 
in neoclassical terminology, in this situation the state decision-maker is necessarily risk-
favouring (Kahneman − Tversky 1979, Thaler et. al 1997).  
Specific examples include state expenditure decisions made in relation to wars, 
environmental catastrophes or those made in connection with economic bail-out packages, where 
the state runs a great risk spending high-value amounts, though at an ignorable probability of 
occurrence4. However, we presume the phenomenon in the case of decisions made in connection 
with discretional operational expenditure policies regarding those of below mean or, from the 
budgetary point of view, ignorably small sizes, however, made in outstandingly large numbers, 
which we study in the framework of empirical research. 
Normative state-financial decision can be opposed to discretional decision-making. It is 
necessary to link state resources with expenditure policy, which is built on the informational 
basis of politics and sectoral policies and on the analysis of the external environment. Raising 
funds and their addition to expenditure are generalizable, irrespective of the political system, and 
are separated from the discretional decision-making mechanism. The aspects of sustainability of 
the internal environment of the state structure appear besides political and sectoral decision-
                                                 
3 To support path dependence empirically, a large number of laboratory experiments have been carried out by 
research groups dealing with this topic. A very interesting and elucidative series of experiments were demonstrated 
by R. Thaler. They analysed rounds of television quiz programs utilizing both neoclassical utility functions and the 
value function of prospect theory. During laboratory experiments related to analyses, they demonstrated the path 
dependence of decision-making in risky situations (Post et al. 2008). 
4 For this situation, based on the statistical distribution, the term “tail risk” is used.  
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making, which are typically financial-budgetary decisions. In the course of preparing budgetary 
decisions, the state’s institutional system creates reference points of normative character, and the 
bargain-mechanism of rule-based planning of budget enforces a proportional distribution of 
resources among sectoral interests.  
In behavioural-economic sense, assuming Kahneman and Tversky’s value functions, the 
state moves in a profit range when imposing taxes. In the positive value range, systematic errors 
and distortions disclosed by behavioural economics can be identified in decision-making – the 
behaviour of the state is necessarily short-sighted and loss-avoiding. In neoclassical terminology, 
when making tax regulations and imposing taxes, the state’s decision-maker acts in a risk-neutral 
and risk-avoiding way, therefore the state’s income-political risk-taking should be definitely 
encouraged. 
Taking into account the fairly large number of discretional decisions, we can presume that 
the state is ready to spend money on environmental risks rather than raise taxes. All this can be 
as well interpreted as a decision motivation aiming to minimize environmental losses. In this 
interpretation, one average income-raising state decision (decision unit), calculable depending on 
the theoretical economic approach, is due to a given discretional operational cost-related decision 
(decision unit). 
Further on, we shall refer to the loss-avoiding motivations of discretional decisions as the 
inherent risk of operational budgetary processes. We use the term to express the risk content of 
state-financial, operational decision-making situations resulting from the environmental 
conditions and its degree deducible from theoretical assumptions. 
Thaler introduces the utility function for loss aversion in a neoclassic basis, intuitively, 
with a rule of thumb applying a coefficient of 2.5, which can be used for state incomes and 
expenditures. Studying the value function of prospect theory we can produce a similar situation. 
The λ coefficient per unit of money, connected with expenditures and expressing the extent of 
loss aversion will be the 2.25 fold of the unit connected with incomes (Thaler et al. 1997). 
Incomes and expenditures originated from coefficients expressing the extent of loss 
aversion generate theoretical operational deficit. By intuitive, neoclassic treatment, its extent, 
irrespective of the size of budget, projected onto balance sheet total of operational expenditures 
is 60 %, using the value function of prospect theory it will be 55.6%. Further on, we shall use 
theoretical operational deficit to express the extent of inherent risk. 
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We have given preference to the analytical framework suggested by behavioural 
economics for the following reasons: 
− In the course of analysing operational risks, we rejected the necessity of analysing 
property, since the chance of occurrence of risk events and its potential effect is 
irrespective of the financial size of it. The changes in operational environment it decisively 
depends on, for the description of which the value function of prospect theory provides a 
suitable analytical framework (Benartzi − Thaler 1995, Chernobai et al. 2007, Kahneman − 
Tversky 1979, Thaler et al. 1997). 
− We have taken the risk community of the modern state as non-property-based, so the 
concept of profit and loss, related to the reference points of the external and internal 
environment is more suitable for the description of state-financial processes of decision-
making (Benartzi − Thaler 1995, Kahneman − Tversky 1979, Kahneman − Thaler 2006, 
Post et al. 2008, Thaler et al. 1997). 
− The risk community of the state is not voluntary; consequently, undertaking some loss is an 
inevitable, certain event. The value function of prospect theory offered an obvious and 
suitable analytical framework to the explanation for situations containing certain loss as 
well (Kahneman − Tversky 1979, Post et al. 2008). 
 
The budget bearing a relative operational risk of 0% and treated on a completely normative 
basis can be identified at the macro-level in the course of planning and implementation of central 
budgets. However, the equilibrium stated in a budgetary golden rule is rarely fulfilled by the 
elementary budget drawn up by institutions at the micro-level, and sectorial balance-sheets at 
mezo-level. The category introduced for operational risk can be well applied at the level of local 
governments, where we can presume that state decision-making is attached to its external 
environment far more intensively. We can also presume that local discretional state-financial 
decision-making is more heavily influenced by the direct reference points of the external 
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3. Results of empirical research 
 
Instead of macroeconomic role-taking of the state, we have focussed our research on the mezo-
level: the system of subnational governments. A wide range of secondary, duly detailed data has 
been available about Hungarian local governments. These data can be made suitable for arranging 
them in a data group according to a theoretical approach and defining the statistical variables. 
Therefore we have carried out our empirical research on the universe of Hungarian institutions 
(Sándorné 2009, 2014, Vigvári 2009). 
We have obtained the basic data containing the operational incomes and expenditures related 
to the total Hungarian system of local governments from the reports of the Hungarian State Treasury 
for 2003-2012. We had to handle the essential content-related and accounting technical differences 
resulting from the specificities of the legal responsibilities of the Hungarian local governmental 
system and from the extreme deviations between the operational sizes of the individual local 
governments. That is why we left the regional (capital city and county) local governments out of the 
scope of local governments studied. The outstanding operational size of Budapest, its national weight 
characterized by an 11.6% mean chronological rate was another argument for leaving it out of the 
empirical research. The large number of the local governments in small settlements did not cause any 
substantial problems in the process of treatment of data sources. 
The pieces of information collectable about the local governmental system from the State 
Treasury are burdened by chronological inconsistencies. Difficulties were caused by changes in the 
structure of items of book-keeping and in the mandatory contents of the individual items on the one 
hand, and the administrational categorization of settlements on the other. Typically, changes in the 
status of public administration involved merger or separation of settlements, which changed the 
number of local governments obliged to give accounts. Following up changes demanded the 
chronological reconstruction of changes in financial and budgetary regulations. Owing to this, 
chronological retrospection caused serious difficulties, which, by limiting the period of time, could 
be more or less resolved. The available Treasury information back to 2003 was reliably interpretable. 
However, the content of data of Treasury reports before this budgetary year changed to such an 
extent that the identification of data and ensuring their comparability would have needed a 
disproportionally great effort compared to the presumable information content. Therefore, we 
indicated 2003 as a year for starting the study. The Hungarian system of local governments has made 
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a radical turn since 2013, the process of decentralization beginning in 1990, burdened by continuous 
political and sectoral policy conflicts, completely broke. The solution of problems since 2013 has 
been taken over by a centralized management, creating several ministerial background institutions. A 
substantial investigation of the effects of this reform needs a longer period of time, which could be 
subject to a following research. Because of this, we finished our study by the year of 2012 and have 
not processed the next accounting years closed by reports. 
For time-related comparability we fixed the settlement structure of 2003, then the data of the 
meanwhile separated settlements according to the state in 2003 and registered them united for the 
original list of settlements in each analysed year. In case of settlements merged in the meantime, we 
cancelled the data of the settlement that was absorbed into the other for 2003 as well and stated the 
value data at the adopting settlement in each analysed year. By the rearrangement of value data we 
achieved that the analysed sets of data have been included in a uniform structure regarding a period 
of 10 years. In this way, by leaving the regional local governments out, our analysis included 3166 
settlements of the Hungarian local governmental system concerning the period between 2003 and 
2012. 
Based on the theoretical theses of behavioural economics in relation to loss aversion we have 
put the following statements: 
H1. Discretional state-financial decisions result in at least the level of relative theoretical 
operational risk (55.6% of inherent risk). 
At the same time, the inherent risk is necessarily curbed by the regulation-based decision-
making environment to a tolerable level, the concrete value of which – typical of the universe of 
Hungarian local governments – we have been searching for.  
Without the mechanism of action of normative decisions budgetary system could fail: 
H2. Because of this, normative state-financial decisions should keep relative operational risk, 
generated by discretional decisions, far below the level of the inherent risk. Theoretically, operational 
risk can be mitigated by normative decisions to 0 %. 
We measured the individually calculated relative operational risk of Hungarian local 
governments for a given t year in the proportion of the difference between fulfilled operational 
income and estimated expenditure and fulfilled estimated expenditure (ROR index) of each local 
government. The proportional indices of relative risk bore unique information regarding the decision-
making entities, which we processed for the whole universe. The statistical characteristics concerning 
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the whole universe are demonstrated by the simple position indices of the variable in Table 1 and in 
Figure 1. 
 
Table 1 Universal Characteristics of ROR Variable between 2003-2012 
Universal Characteristics per Year of 
ROR Variable
2003. 2004. 2005. 2006. 2007.
Maximum of ROR 85,07% 83,57% 84,71% 86,44% 82,78%
Benchmark Value of IR 55,56% 55,56% 55,56% 55,56% 55,56%
Average of ROR 33,21% 30,59% 35,94% 33,18% 24,39%
Standard Deviation of ROR 16,55% 17,48% 16,04% 16,30% 14,57%
Coefficient of Variation of ROR 50% 57% 45% 49% 60%
Universe (N) 3 166 3 166 3 166 3 166 3 166
Risk Events (n) 2 942 2 851 3 030 3 005 2 868
2008. 2009. 2010. 2011. 2012.
Maximum of ROR 90,46% 93,72% 93,39% 87,61% 85,76%
Benchmark Value of IR 55,56% 55,56% 55,56% 55,56% 55,56%
Average of ROR 44,03% 34,18% 43,78% 40,30% 45,52%
Standard Deviation of ROR 17,57% 19,96% 18,12% 17,93% 18,31%
Coefficient of Variation of ROR 40% 58% 41% 44% 40%
Universe (N) 3 166 3 166 3 166 3 166 3 166
Risk Events (n) 3 111 2 911 3 105 3 080 3 100
Time Series Average of:
Maximum of ROR 
Benchmark Value of IR
Average of ROR
Standard Deviation of ROR










Source: own construction based on Hungarian State Treasury balance sheets 
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Source: own construction based on Hungarian State Treasury balance sheets 
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To measure the level of relative operational risk resulting from the background processes 
forming the microenvironment of discretional decisions, we used the mROR indicator (modified 
relative operational risk indicator), which expresses the rate of difference between local tax 
incomes and tangible expenditures projected onto tangible expenditures. Changes in modified 
relative operational risk indicator between 2003 and 2012 are shown in Table 2 and in Figure 2. 
 
Table 2 Universal Characteristics of mROR Variable between 2003-2012 
Universal Characteristics per Year of 
mROR Variable
2003. 2004. 2005. 2006. 2007.
Maximum of mROR 149,41% 103,32% 157,79% 117,44% 116,21%
Benchmark Value of IR 55,56% 55,56% 55,56% 55,56% 55,56%
Average of mROR 74,53% 73,04% 71,77% 70,05% 65,68%
Standard Deviation of mROR 26,34% 27,31% 28,13% 29,07% 31,02%
Coefficient of Variation of mROR 35% 37% 39% 42% 47%
Universe (N) 3 166 3 166 3 166 3 166 3 166
Risk Events (n) 2 942 2 851 3 030 3 005 2 868
2008. 2009. 2010. 2011. 2012.
Maximum of mROR 112,74% 100,00% 102,32% 121,70% 117,34%
Benchmark Value of IR 55,56% 55,56% 55,56% 55,56% 55,56%
Average of mROR 65,13% 64,95% 67,06% 61,07% 64,72%
Standard Deviation of mROR 30,74% 30,87% 29,47% 32,07% 30,58%
Coefficient of Variation of mROR 47% 48% 44% 53% 47%
Universe (N) 3 166 3 166 3 166 3 166 3 166
Risk Events (n) 3 111 2 911 3 105 3 080 3 100
Time Series Average of:
Maximum of mROR 
Benchmark Value of IR
Average of mROR
Standard Deviation of mROR










Source: own construction based on Hungarian State Treasury balance sheets 
 
The time series average of the relative operational risk (mROR) from the discretional 
decisions at the mezo-level between 2003 and 2012 at the observed Hungarian universe of local 
governments came to nearly 68 %. The mean yearly value at the mezo-level each year exceeded 
the theoretical value of 55.6 % (IR) calculable according to the value function of prospect theory, 
presuming loss aversion. At the same time, the level of risk (ROR) calculated for the total 
operational budget, which also expresses the mechanism of action of normative state-financial 
decisions, was 37 %. The mitigating effect of regulation-based decisions can be well perceived; 
at the same time, the mean level of decisional micro-environment, far higher than the inherent 
risk, is a warning sign.  
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Source: own construction based on Hungarian State Treasury balance sheets 
 
We studied this mechanism by the simultaneous application of several risk indicators as 
well. The evaluation of risk introduces an asymmetric distribution of operational risk according 
to the categories of operational size in relation to operational expenditures. According to the risk 
evaluation carried out, the 64-80 % of the value amount of operational risk (OR) was 
concentrated in 7-13 % of local governments in the period of 2003-2012. The high relative 
operational risk level and its asymmetric distribution of value amount direct our attention to the 
contradiction which developed between the efforts of local governments towards their 
environments and the sustainability of their operational balance and financial resources in 
Hungary between 2003 and 2012.  
 
4. Suggestions and further directions of research 
 
Theoretical possibilities of research present themselves on the bordering surfaces of the 
local governmental sector, first of all in connection with modelling the institutional capacities 
becoming necessary in the direction of local markets, local societies and local natural values. 
What quantitative and qualitative characteristics does the optimally formulated local 
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governmental institutional system have, which generates the lowest possible absolute operational 
risk at the mezo-level? The other bordering surface is the regulatory, controlling and financing 
system. Essentially, we can ask the same question as before: is there a normative financing 
model which creates the lowest possible absolute operational risk at the mezo-level regarding 
local governments? The problem can be approached from many kinds of directions. In my view, 
a regulatory and institution-building approach underpinned theoretically, treating information 
with a “rule of reason” attitude, combined with the transformation of financing system stressing 
the elements of being stuck to rules, can considerably mitigate the absolute and relative 
operational risk of local governmental system.  
Apart from further development of theoretical frameworks, research should be deepened in 
the direction of methodology as well. The operational risk indicators already established can be 
divided further. Based on the system of indices accepted in financial analyses, complex, detailed 
sub-indicators can be constructed, by which we can identify the detailed characteristics of 
operational risk processes. 
The introduced methodology can be applied for the empirical analysis of the local 
governmental system of the individual states in a complex way. The selection of data sources, 
getting to know the regulatory system of the particular state, the identification and testing of 
statistical variables required for the use of the methodology involve serious challenge. The 
analytical methodological framework, suitable for the international comparison of operational 
risks, can be made up by the utilization of the experience of studies conducted in a large number 
at the sectoral level. This direction of development extends the practical application of the 
method as well, and may yield further theoretical and methodological results that cannot be 
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